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Law and Heidegger’s Question Concerning Technology: 
Prolegomenon to Future Law Librarianship*
Paul	D.	Callister**
Professor Callister explains the criticisms of technology and modern life prof-
fered by German philosopher Martin Heidegger. He applies the criticisms to 
the current legal information environment and contrasts developing technolo-
gies and current attitudes and practices with earlier Anglo-American tradi-
tions. Finally, he considers the implications for law librarianship in the current 
information environment.
POOR	 librarians.	 Soon,	 no	 doubt,	 to	 go	 the	way	 of	 blacksmiths	 and	 town	 criers,	 their	
chosen	 field	made	 obsolete	 by	 Internet	 search	 engines	 and	 self-perpetuating	 electronic	
databases.1
¶1	 Following	World	War	 II,	 the	German	 philosopher	Martin	Heidegger	 offered	
one	of	the	most	potent	criticisms	of	technology	and	modern	life.	His	nightmare	is	
a	world	whose	essence	has	been	reduced	to	the	functional	equivalent	of	“a	giant	
gasoline	station,	an	energy	source	for	modern	technology	and	industry.	This	rela-
tion	of	man	to	the	world	[is]	in	principle	a	technical	one.	.	.	.	[It	is]	altogether	alien	
to	former	ages	and	histories.”2	For	Heidegger,	the	problem	is	not	technology	itself,	
but	the	technical	mode	of	thinking	that	has	accompanied	it.	Such	a	viewpoint	of	
the	world	is	a	useful	paradigm	to	consider	humanity’s	relationship	to	law	in	the	
current	 information	environment,	which	is	 increasingly	 technical	 in	Heidegger’s	
sense	of	the	term.	
¶2	Heidegger’s	warning	that	a	technical	approach	to	thinking	about	the	world	
obscures	its	true	essence	is	directly	applicable	to	the	effects	of	the	current	(as	well	
as	former)	information	technologies	that	provide	access	to	law.	The	thesis	of	this	
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	 1.	 Neil	Genzlinger,	The Fog of Facts,	n.y. tiMes, Oct.17,	2004,	§	7,	at	12,	available at LEXIS,	News	
Library,	NYT	File.
	 2.	 MaRtin heideggeR,	Memorial Address, in disCoURse on thinKing 43, 50 (John	M.	Anderson	&	E.	
Hans	Freund	trans.,	Harper	&	Row	1966)	(1959).	
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article	is	 that	Heidegger	provides	an	escape,	not	only	for	libraries	threatened	by	
obsolescence	by	emerging	technologies,	but	for	the	law	itself,	which	is	under	the	
same	risk	of	subjugation.	This	article	explains	the	nature	of	Heidegger’s	criticisms	
of	 technology	and	modern	life,	and	explores	the	threat	specifically	identified	by	
such	 criticism,	 including	 an	 illustration	 based	 upon	 systematic	 revision	 of	 law	
in	Nazi	Germany.	 It	applies	Heidegger’s	criticisms	 to	 the	current	 legal	 informa-
tion	environment	and	contrasts	developing	technologies	and	current	attitudes	and	
practices	with	earlier	Anglo-American	traditions.	Finally,	the	article	considers	the	
implications	for	law	librarianship	in	the	current	information	environment.
Heidegger’s Nightmare: Understanding the Beast
Calculative Thinking and the Danger of Subjugation to a Single Will
¶3	The	threat	is	not	technology	itself;	it	is	rather	a	danger	based	in	the	essence	of	
thinking,	which	Heidegger	describes	as	“enframing”3	or	“calculative	 thinking.”4	
For	Heidegger,	the	problem	is	that	mankind	misconstrues	the	nature	of	technology	
as	simply	“a	means	to	an	end.”5	
¶4	 Heidegger’s	 articulation	 of	 the	 common	 conception	 of	 technology	 as	 a	
“means”	 applies	 equally	well	 to	 information	 technologies,	 including	 legal	 data-
bases.	True,	it	is	hard	to	think	of	technology	in	any	other	way,	but	what	Heidegger	
argues	 is	 that	 this	 failure	 to	 consider	 the	 essence	 of	 technology	 is	 a	 threat	 to	
humanity.6
¶5	He	defines	the	threat	in	two	ways.	First,	humans	become	incapable	of	see-
ing	anything	around	them	as	but	things	to	be	brought	into	readiness	to	serve	some	
end	(a	concept	he	refers	to	as	“standing	reserve”).7	They	are	thereby	cut	off	from	
understanding	the	essence	of	things	and,	consequently,	their	surrounding	world.8	
Second,	man	 is	 reduced	 to	 the	 role	of	“order-er”	of	 things,	 specifically	 to	some	
purpose	or	end,	and,	as	a	result,	risks	becoming	something	to	be	ordered	as	well.9	
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	 3.	 See	William	Lovitt,	 Introduction	 to	MaRtin heideggeR, the qUestion ConCeRning teChnology 
and otheR essays,	at	xxix	(Willliam	Lovitt	trans.,	1977).
	 4.	 heideggeR,	supra	note	2,	at	46.	
	 5.	 See	 MaRtin heideggeR,	 The Question Concerning Technology,	 in	 the qUestion ConCeRning 
teChnology and otheR essays,	supra	note	3,	at	4–5	(“Technology	is	a	means	to	an	end.”).
	 6.	 See infra	¶¶	11–17	for	an	example	of	how	Nazism	reduced	humanity	to	a	thing	to	be	ordered.
	 7.	 See	Lovitt,	supra note	3,	at	xxix	(“Today	all	things	are	being	swept	together	into	a	vast	network	in	
which	their	only	meaning	lies	in	their	being	available	to	serve	some	end	that	will	itself	also	be	directed	
toward	getting	everything	under	control.	Heidegger	calls	this	fundamentally	undifferentiated	supply	
of	the	available	the	‘standing	reserve.’”).
	 8.	 See heideggeR,	supra	note	3,	at	28	(“The	rule	of	Enframing	threatens	man	with	the	possibility	that	
it	could	be	denied	to	him	to	enter	into	a	more	original	revealing	and	hence	to	experience	the	call	of	a	
more	primal	truth.”).
	 9.	 Id.	at	26–27	(“As	soon	as	.	.	.	man	.	.	.	is	nothing	but	the	orderer	of	the	standing-reserve,	then	he	comes	
to	the	very	brink	of	a	precipitous	fall;	that	is	he	comes	to	the	point	where	he	himself	will	have	to	be	
taken	as	standing-reserve.”).
Heidegger	illustrates	these	concerns	as	follows:
The	forester	who,	 in	 the	wood,	measures	 the	felled	 timber	and	 to	all	appearances	walks	
the	same	forest	path	in	the	same	way	as	did	his	grandfather	is	today	commanded	by	profit-
making	in	the	lumber	industry,	whether	he	knows	it	or	not.	He	is	made	subordinate	to	the	
orderability	of	cellulose,	which	for	its	part	is	challenged	forth	by	the	need	for	paper,	which	
is	then	delivered	to	newspapers	and	illustrated	magazines.	The	latter,	in	their	turn,	set	pub-
lic	opinion	to	swallowing	what	is	printed,	so	that	a	set	configuration	of	opinion	becomes	
available	on	demand.10
In	other	words,	the	trees,	the	wood,	the	paper,	and	even	the	forester	(whose	ances-
tors	once	understood	the	sanctity	of	the	woods)	are	ultimately	subordinated	to	the	
will	to	establish	orderly	public	opinion.	The	forester,	in	proverbial	fashion,	“can-
not	see	the	forest	for	the	trees.”	Instead	of	appreciating	the	majesty	and	mystery	
of	the	living	forest,	he	sees	only	fodder	for	the	paper	mill,	which	will	pay	for	his	
next	meal.
¶6	The	same	cynicism	might	be	applied	to	legal	publishing.	Whole	forests	have	
given	their	lives	to	the	publication	of	legal	information	in	order	to	provide	a	stable	
basis	for	society—after	all,	the	“law	must	be	stable	and	yet	it	cannot	stand	still,”11	
or	as	our	comrades	from	Critical	Legal	Studies	might	put	it,	law	is	simply	a	tool	“to	
perpetuate	the	existing	socioeconomic	status	quo.”12	Cadres	of	West	editors	(com-
monly	referred	to	in	generic	fashion	as	human resources,	ironically	making	them	
all	 the	 less	human)13	work	 feverishly	 to	 digest	 points	 of	 law	and	 assign	55,000	
cases	into	a	taxonomy	with	more	than	100,000	class	distinctions,14	all	for	the	sake	
of	a	predictable	legal	system	and	stable	society.
¶7	For	Heidegger,	the	threat	is	revealed	in	mankind’s	perpetual	quest	to	gain	
mastery	over	technology.	“Everything	depends	on	our	manipulating	technology	in	
the	proper	manner	as	a	means.	We	will,	as	we	say,	‘get’	technology	‘spiritually	in	
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	 10.	 Id.	at	18.	Heidegger	finds	that	man	“never	is	transformed	into	mere	standing-reserve”	because	of	his	
unique	position	as	the	“order-er”	of	everything	else.	Id.
	 11.	 RosCoe poUnd, inteRpRetations oF legal histoRy	1	(1923).
	 12.	 blaCK’s law diCtionaRy	382	(Bryan	A.	Garner	ed.,	7th	ed.,	1999).	For	a	more	thorough	definition	
of	Critical Legal Studies,	see	John	Henry	Schlegel,	Critical Legal Studies,	in oxFoRd CoMpanion to 
aMeRiCan law 202 (Kermit	L.	Hall	ed.,	2002).
	 13.	 See	heideggeR,	supra	note	3,	at	18	(“If	man	is	challenged,	ordered,	 to	do	this,	 then	does	not	man	
himself	belong	even	more	originally	than	nature	within	the	standing-reserve?	The	current	talk	about	
human	resources,	about	the	supply	of	patients	for	a	clinic,	gives	evidence	of	this.”).
	 14.	 See Paul	Douglas	Callister,	Beyond Training: Law Librarianship’s Quest for the Pedagogy of Legal 
Research Education,	95	law libR. J. 7, 21, 2003 law libR. J. 1, ¶ 33 (estimating	number	of	cases	
published	annually	by	West	 in	print);	Dan	Dabney,	The Universe of Thinkable Thoughts: Literary 
Warrant and West’s Key Number System,	99	law libR. J.	229,	236,	2007	law libR. J.14,	¶	33	(esti-
mating	number	of	lines	in	West	classification	system).	Interestingly,	Dabney	has	recently	expressed	
concern	that	large	systems	such	as	the	West	Topic	and	Key	Number	System	are	limited	in	effective-
ness	to	their	current	100,000	classes.	See Dan	Dabney,	A	Brief	Practical	Introduction	to	Taxonomies	
7	 (Thompson	Legal	Knowledge	and	Trends	White	Paper,	n.d.).	Apparently,	humanity’s	 role	as	 the	
order-er	 of	 things	 is	 “at	 capacity,”	 and	 is,	 presumably,	 in	 need	 of	 technological	 replacement.	 See 
heideggeR,	supra	note	3,	at	18.
2006-17] Law and Heidegger’s Question
hand.’	We	will	master	it.	The	will	to	mastery	becomes	all	the	more	urgent	the	more	
technology	 threatens	 to	 slip	 from	human	control.”15	When	Heidegger	published	
these	words	(first	in	1962,	but	based	on	lectures	from	1949	and	1950),16	the	impli-
cations	of	nuclear	energy	and	atomic	warfare	occupied	much	academic	discussion.	
Heidegger	points	out	that	the	popular	question	of	this	period	did	not	concern	how	
to	find	sufficient	energy	resources,	but	“[i]n	what	way	can	we	tame	and	direct	the	
unimaginably	vast	amounts	of	atomic	energies,	and	so	secure	mankind	against	the	
danger	 that	 these	 gigantic	 energies	 suddenly—even	 without	 military	 actions—
break	out	somewhere,	‘run	away’	and	destroy	everything?”17	The	modern	question	
is	about	our	mastery	over	technology,	not	about	sufficiency	of	resources.
¶8	 Similar	 concerns	 are	 apparent	 with	 respect	 to	 information	 technologies,	
where	the	primary	problem	is	not	lack	of	access,	but	too	much	access:	for	example,	
illegal	 music	 file	 swapping,18	 the	 anti-circumvention	 provisions	 of	 the	 Digital	
Millennium	Copyright	Act	(DMCA),19	and	trends	to	use	licensing	to	control	and	
preserve	 the	 economic	value	of	 information	 (and	 to	prohibit	 otherwise	 lawfully	
competitive	 practices,	 such	 as	 reverse	 engineering).20	With	 respect	 to	 law	 and	
government,	we	see	such	examples	as	retraction	of	government	documents,21	the	
Patriot	Act,22	 the	 furor	 over	 unpublished	 electronic	 precedent,23	 and	 the	 recent	
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	 15.	 heideggeR, supra	note	3,	at	5.
	 16.	 Lovitt,	supra	note	3,	at	ix.
	 17.	 heideggeR,	supra	note	2,	at	51.
	 18.	 See, e.g.,	 David	 Shepardson,	 Sony, Others Sue 9 U-M Downloaders; Record Companies Accuse 
Students of Taking Music Illegally,	detRoit news,	Apr.	2,	2004,	at	1D,	available at	LEXIS,	News	
Library,	Detroit	News	File.
	 19.	 17	U.S.C.	§§	1201(a)–(b)	(2000).
	 20.	 Compare	Davidson	&	Assocs.	 v.	 Jung,	 422	F.3d	 630	 (8th	Cir.	 2005)	 (end-user	 license	 agreement	
validly	prohibited	 reverse-engineering	even	when	copyright	 law	may	have	permitted	 it)	with	Sony	
Computer	Entm’t,	Inc.	v.	Connectix	Corp.,	203	F.3d	596	(9th	Cir.	2000)	(reverse-engineering	permit-
ted	under	fair	use	when	no	end-user	license	agreement	restrictions	banning	the	practice	were	an	issue	
in	the	case).
	 21.	 See, e.g.,	 News	 Release,	 U.S.	 Gov’t	 Printing	 Office,	 Statement	 on	 Request	 to	Withdraw	 USGS	
Source-Water	CD-Rom	from	Depository	Libraries	(Jan.	16,	2002),	available at	http://www.access.
gpo.gov/public-affairs/news/02news04.html.
	 22.	 Uniting	 and	 Strengthening	 America	 by	 Providing	 Appropriate	 Tools	 Required	 to	 Intercept	 and	
Obstruct	Terrorism	(USA	PATRIOT)	Act	of	2001,	Pub.	L.	No.	107-56,	115	Stat.	272	(2001)	(codified	
as	amended	in	scattered	sections	of	18,	50,	and	other	titles	of	U.S.C.);	USA	PATRIOT	Improvement	
and	Reauthorization	Act	of	2005,	Pub.	L.	No.	109-177,	120	Stat.	192	(2006)	(codified	in	scattered	
sections	of	18,	50,	and	other	titles	of	U.S.C.).
	 23.	 See Molly	McDonough,	Door Slowly Opens for Unpublished Opinions,	a.b.a. J. e-RepoRt, Apr.	21, 
2006	(“Judges	and	lawyers	opposed	to	the	[Supreme	Court	rule	permitting	citation	of	unpublished	
opinions]	have	referred	to	unpublished	opinions	as	‘junk	law.’	They	flooded	the	advisory	committee	
with	some	500	letters	opposing	the	citation	rule.”);	Stephanie	Francis	Ward, Giving Their Opinions: 
Committee Backs Rule Allowing Lawyers to Cite Unpublished Decisions,	A.B.A.	J.	e-RepoRt,	Apr. 
23, 2004	(quoting	federal	Ninth	Circuit	Judge	Alex	Kozinski:	“Given	the	press	of	our	cases,	espe-
cially	screening	cases,	we	simply	do	not	have	 the	 time	 to	shape	and	edit	unpublished	dispositions	
to	make	 them	 safe	 as	 precedent.”);	 Paul	Marcotte,	Unpublished but Influential: With Technology, 
Opinions Not in the Law Books Can Be Misused, Critics Charge,	A.B.A.	 J.,	 Jan.	 1991,	 at	 26,	 26	
(“[Lauren]	Robel	fears,	for	example,	that	bar	groups	and	scholars	will	be	unable	to	discern	trends	in	
case	law	covering	federal	agency	decision-making	because	of	the	growing	numbers	of	unpublished	
opinions.”).
frenzy	of	e-discovery.24	Some	stakeholders	seem	to	have	liked	things	better	when	
information	resources	were	scarce.25	Universal	access	is	destabilizing—hence,	the	
considerable	 interest	 in	getting	a	“handle”	on	 technology	 through	 legal	sanction	
and	yet	additional	 technological	 innovation	(the	so-called	“access	control”	 tech-
nologies).26
¶9	Heidegger’s	genius	is	in	recognizing	that	all	the	fuss	about	mastering	tech-
nologies,	although	close	to	the	mark,	concerns	the	wrong	issue.	The	more	insidi-
ous	threat	is	not	nuclear	fallout	or	economic	devaluation	of	intellectual	property,	
but	 the	worldview	 of	 “calculative”	 thinking	 that	 accompanies	 rapid	 technologi-
cal	change:	“The	world	now	appears	as	an	object	open	 to	attacks	of	calculative	
thought,	attacks	that	nothing	is	believed	able	any	longer	to	resist.”27	For	Heidegger,	
calculative	thought	is	not	limited	to	the	manipulation	of	machine	code	or	numbers.	
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	 24.	 See,	e.g.,	Carolyn	Southerland,	Ignorance of IT Minutiae No Excuse for Litigators,	28 nat’l l.J., July	
17,	2006,	at	S3;	Kristin	M.	Nimsger	&	Michele	C.	S.	Lange,	E is for Evidence: Examining Recent E-
Discovery Developments,	gpsolo,	Mar.	2006,	at	40,	available at	http://www.abanet.org/genpractice/
magazine/2006/mar/scitech.html;	James	M.	(Duke)	Johnston	Jr.	&	Philip	A.	Whistler,	E-Discovery: 
A Critical Litigation Issue for Franchisors and Franchisees,	26	FRanChise l.J.	20	(2006);	Marianne	
Tolomeo	 &	 Brett	 Kuller,	 Litigation Strategies In Light of Document Retention Requirements for 
Electronic Records,	tRial pRaC.,	Fall	2005,	at	6;	David	K.	Isom,	Electronic Discovery: New Power, 
New Risks,	Utah b.J.,	Nov.	2003,	at	8.
	 25.	 The	 issue	 is	perhaps	discomfort	with	 the	pace	of	 technological	change	 (specifically	 the	speed	and	
accuracy	of	the	Internet)	and	its	impact	on	entertainment	industries.	See, e.g., Privacy and Piracy: 
The Paradox of Illegal File Sharing on Peer-to-Peer Networks and the Impact of the Technology on 
the Entertainment Industry: Hearing Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the S. 
Comm. on Governmental Affairs,	108th	Cong.	18	(2003),	available at	http://hsgac.senate.gov/_files/	
shrg108275privacy_piracy.pdf	 (testimony	 of	 Jack	 Valenti,	 President	 &	 CEO,	 Motion	 Picture	
Association	of	America)	(“If	we	just	stopped	[development	of	broadband	Internet]	right	now,	if	the	
world	just	stopped,	we	would	be	doing	fine	because	we	[the	motion	picture	industry]	could	survive	
it.”).	Valenti	was	particularly	concerned	about	the	future	speed	of	the	Internet:
	 	 Scientists	at	CalTech	have	announced	“FAST,”	an	experimental	program	that	can	download	a	
DVD	quality	movie	 in	 five	seconds!	 .	 .	 .	Can	anyone	deny	 that	 these	huge	download	speeds	
brood	over	our	future?	Can	anyone	deny	that	when	one	can	upload	and	download	movies	in	
seconds	or	minutes	the	rush	to	illegally	obtain	films	will	reach	“pandemic stage?”
  Id. at	91–92	(prepared	statement	of	Jack	Valenti)	(emphasis	added).
	 	 	 Perhaps,	 the	 real	 problem	 is	 a	 lack	 of	 scarcity	 or	 “friction”	 in	 the	 new	 technologies—they	 are	
simply	too	accurate	and	fast.	See siva vaidhyanathan, the anaRChist in the libRaRy: how the 
Clash between FReedoM and ContRol is haCKing the Real woRld and CRashing the systeM, 
at	xi	(2004)	(discussing	“how	we	could	install	‘friction’	into	an	otherwise	unregulated	medium;	about	
how	closely	we	should	try	to	make	cyberspace	conform	to	and	resemble	the	analog	world”);	see also 
id.	at	xiii	(“The	collapse	of	inconvenience	has	sparked	a	series	of	efforts	that	could	reestablish	the	
distance,	or	friction,	that	our	information	systems	have	featured	since	the	rise	of	moveable	type	and	
bound	books.”);	id.	at	13	(explaining	the	theory	postulated	in	RobeRt Kaplan, the CoMing anaRChy	
(2000),	“that	the	stable	comfort	of	the	modern	nation-state	is	doomed	because	too	many	dangerous	
goods,	services,	and	ideas	can	flow	too	easily	without	traditional	regard	for	authority	and	tradition”);	
id.	at	87 (“The	fundamental	purpose	of	intellectual	property	law	is	to	create	artificial	scarcity.”).
	 26.	 “Despite	 the	obvious	 futility	of	 anti-piracy	 efforts,	 governments	 throughout	 the	world	 are	 shifting	
to	the	technological	regulation	of	distribution	from	the	human	to	the	technological,	and	expanding	
the	jurisdiction	from	the	national	to	global.”	vaidhyanathan, supra note	25,	at	101.	See generally 
lawRenCe lessig, Code and otheR laws oF CybeRspaCe	(1999);	lawRenCe lessig, the FUtURe 
oF ideas: the Fate oF the CoMMons in a ConneCted woRld	(2001).
	 27.	 heideggeR,	supra note	2,	at	50.
2006-17] Law and Heidegger’s Question
Rather,	 the	concept	is	grounded	in	“Machiavellian	scheming”	and	the	pursuit	of	
power.	“Calculative	thinking	computes.	It	computes	ever	new,	ever	more	promis-
ing	and	at	the	same	time	more	economical	possibilities.	Calculative	thinking	races	
from	one	prospect	to	the	next.”28	The	threat	Heidegger	envisions	to	human	thought	
is	even	more	dangerous	than	nuclear	warfare.29
¶10	 Heidegger’s	 threat	 is	 based	 on	 the	 separation	 of	 man	 from	 his	 or	 her	
nature.	By	pursuing	economic	calculation,	man	is	cut	off	from	the	transformative	
powers	of	his	or	her	environment.	In	such	a	world,	law	does	not	have	the	capacity	
to	educate	or	to	provide	the	basis	for	social	harmony;30	rather,	like	any	resource,	
law	must	be	employed	to	more	economic	ends.	The	implication	is	that	calculative	
thinking	mandates	 that	everything	 (including	 law)	be	 subjected	 to	a	 single	will.	
While	Heidegger	recognized	the	danger	of	subjecting	everything	to	a	single	will,	
the	issue	of	whether,	and	when,	he	equated	the	danger	with	Nazi	totalitarianism,	
which	he	had	originally	supported,	would	require	a	 line	of	historical	 inquiry	far	
beyond	 the	 scope	 of	 this	 article.31	Regardless	 of	Heidegger’s	 own	 political	 and	
moral	journey,	Nazism	effectively	illustrates	Heidegger’s	philosophical	fear—that	
technological	thinking	risks	the	“ordering”	of	all	 the	world,	including	humanity,	
as	resources	subject	to	a	singular	will.
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	 28.	 Id. at	46.
	 29.	 Id.	at	52	(“[A]n	attack	with	technological	means	is	being	prepared	upon	the	life	and	nature	of	man	
compared	with	which	the	explosion	of	the	hydrogen	bomb	means	little.”).
	 30.	 See infra ¶	28.
	 31.	 One	of	the	best	treatments	of	the	issue	is	Safranski’s	critique	of	Heidegger’s	responses	to	his	famous	
interview	with	Der Spiegel,	which	 took	 place	 on	 September	 23,	 1964,	 in	 Freidenburg,	 but	which	
was	 not	 published	 until	 his	 death.	See RüdigeR saFRansKi, MaRtin heideggeR: between good 
and evil	418–21	(Ewald	Osers	trans.,	1998).	Safranski	believes	Heidegger	recognized	that	Nazism	
had	 ultimately	 been	 guilty	 of	 technological	 reductionism,	 as	 used	 in	 this	 article	 (or	 reducing	 the	
world,	including	men,	to	a	resource	for	exploitation).	See	id.	at	420	(footnote	omitted)	(“When	the	
interview	turned	to	the	problem	that	‘technology	tears	men	loose	from	the	earth	and	uproots	them,’	
Heidegger	pointed	out	that	National	Socialism	had	originally	intended	to	oppose	such	a	development	
[technological	reductionism]	but	had	subsequently	become	its	motor.”).	In	a	review	of	The Heidegger 
Controversy: A Critical Reader,	Thomas	Sheehan	is	much	more	skeptical	of	how	far	(and	how	soon)	
Heidegger	distanced	himself	 from	his	 initial	embrace	of	Nazism.	See	Thomas	Sheehan,	A Normal 
Nazi,	n.y. Rev. booKs,	Jan.	14,	1993,	at	31.
	 	 Heidegger’s	disillusionment	had	to	do	with	the	[Nazi]	party’s	failure	to	carry	out	Heidegger’s	
own	philosophical	program	of	 renewing	 the	promise	of	 the	ancient	Greek	polis,	overcoming	
European	nihilism,	and	returning	Germany	to	a	less	hectic	and	more	simple	life.	Thus	his	so	
called	“break”	with	official	Nazism	in	the	mid-Thirties	consisted	in	his	decision	to	be	more	true	
to	the	“inner	truth	and	greatness”	of	the	movement	than	the	party	ever	could	be.
  Id. at	35	(citing	eRnst nolte, MaRtin heideggeR, politiK Und gesChiCte iM leben Und denKen 
(politiCs and histoRy in his liFe and thoUght) 164–65 (1992)).	 For	 general	 discussion	 of	
Heidegger	 and	 his	 affiliation	with	Nazism,	 see	saFRansKi, supra;	 Sheehan,	 supra;	nolte,	 supra;	
Johannes FRitsChe, histoRiCal destiny and national soCialisM in heideggeR’s Being and Time 
(1999);	hUgo ott, MaRtin heideggeR: a politiCal liFe	(Allan	Blunden	trans.,	1993);	hans slUga, 
heideggeR’s CRisis: philosophy and politiCs in nazi geRMany	(1993); heideggeR ContRoveRsy: 
a CRitiCal ReadeR (Richard	Wolin	ed.,	1991).
Subjection of Law to Will—The Nazi Experience
¶11	 While	 serving	 as	 a	 law	 librarian	 at	 the	 University	 of	 Illinois	 at	 Urbana-
Champaign,	I	learned	that	a	special	mission	of	the	Library	of	Congress	had	seized	
contents	of	Nazi	libraries	following	World	War	II.	As	part	of	a	library	lecture	series,	
Tom	Kilton	and	Gail	Hueting,	university	 librarians	from	the	Modern	Languages	
and	Linguistics	Library,	 discussed	 items	 seized	by	 the	Library	of	Congress	 and	
distributed	to	various	American	libraries.	Some	of	the	items	were	held	in	various	
University	 of	 Illinois	 campus	 libraries,	 but	 at	 the	 time	 of	Kilton	 and	Hueting’s	
presentation,	no	one	had	looked	seriously	at	the	law	school	library.	Motivated	by	
the	 lecture	and	with	 some	effort,	 I	was	able	 to	 identify	more	 than	 seventy	 such	
items	at	the	law	library	and	many	other	legal	titles	that	traced	their	origin	to	Nazi	
Germany.32
¶12	As	I	made	my	way	through	some	of	the	legal	materials,	I	was	struck	by	the	
fact	that	the	Nazis	did	not	simply	ignore	law;	rather,	they	systematically	rewrote	
it	to	their	own	purposes.	For	example,	consider	the	following	translation	of	a	Nazi	
business	organizations	statute:
The	industrial	concern	of	a	legal	person	is	considered	as	Jewish,	
(a)	 if	one	or	several	of	the	persons	appointed	as	legal	representation	or	one	or	several	
of	the	members	of	the	supervisory	board	are	Jews;	
(b)	 if	Jews	are	crucially	 involved	as	 to	capital	or	right	 to	vote.	Crucial	participation	
in	capital	occurs	if	more	than	one	quarter	of	the	capital	belongs	to	Jews;	crucial	
participation	as	to	right	to	vote	occurs	if	the	Jewish	voices	(voters)	reach	half	of	
the	total	number	of	voices	(voters).33
The	section	then	goes	on	to	address	issues	of	subsidiaries	and	mining	enterprises.34	
Having	been	a	tax	attorney	in	a	former	life,	I	am	struck	by	the	technical	precision	
and	 lengths	 to	which	Nazi	 draftsmen	went	 to	 define	 “Jewish”	business	 entities.	
Technical	definitions	of	“controlled	groups”	and	“closely	held”	corporations	illus-
trate	similar	precision	in	draftsmanship	with	respect	to	U.S.	tax	law,	but	without	
the	anti-Semitism.35	The	Nazis,	at	least	in	1934,	did	not	simply	ignore	the	law;	they	
reworked	it	with	great	care	and	precision	to	their	own	ends.
¶13	This	was	 a	Nazi	 legal	 academy,	 complete	with	 law	professors,	 some	of	
whom	 sported	 Nazi	 pins	 or	 armbands,	 who	 systematically	 set	 about	 to	 rewrite	
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	 32.	 See Library Lines: A Reminder to Never Forget the Past,	ill. JURist,	Spring	2002,	at	25–26;	gail 
p. hUeting, speCial ColleCtions in geRMan stUdies in noRth aMeRiCan libRaRies (rev.	 Feb.	
1,	 2005),	 http://www.dartmouth.edu/~wessweb/gdgspeccoll.html	 (Item	 no.	 16,	 National Socialist 
Literature,	 briefly	 describes	 the	 17,000	 volumes	 held	 by	 the	 University	 of	 Illinois	 as	 part	 of	 the	
Cooperative	Acquisitions	Project	for	Wartime	Publications.).
	 33.	 heinRiCh sChönFeldeR, deUtsChe ReiChsgesetze saMMlUng des veRFassUngs, geMein, stRaF 
Und veRFahRensReChts FüR den tägliChen gebRaUCh	§	10a,	art.	1,	para.	1,	subpara.	III	(13th	ed.,	
1943)	(passage	translated	by	author).
	 34.	 Id.	at	subpara.	IV.
	 35.	 See, e.g.,	26	U.S.C.	§§	447(h),	1563	(2000).
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the	 law	according	 to	Nazi	 ideals.36	 In	a	 translated	 foreword	 to	 the	Academy for 
German Law Yearbook	1933/34,	Dr.	Hans	Frank,	director	of	the	German	Academy	
of	Justice,	revealed	his	own	“instrumental”37	attitudes	about	German	law	and	legal	
academia	when	he	wrote:	
Being	entrusted	with	the	Fuhrer’s	call	for	the	revision	of	the	German	empire’s	legal	sys-
tem,	.	.	.	I	have	the	Academy	for	German	Justice,	which	shall	demand	the	reorganization	
of	the	German	legal	life	in	close	and	lasting	conjunction	with	the	proper	authorities	for	the	
legislation	of	the	National	Socialist	program.	.	.	.
	 .	.	.	Germany	has	at	its	disposal	the	greatest	jurist’s	organization	of	the	world,	the	Union	
of	 National	 Socialist	 German	 Jurists,	 to	 set	 down	 a	method	 of	 working,	 which	 differs	
from	 the	 lawmaking	of	 fundamental	 liberalist	aims.	 In	hardly	any	other	area	of	 life	has	
the	parliamentary	methods	of	the	party	state	had	a	more	fatal	effect	than	in	the	field	of	the	
lawmaking	and	legislation.38
In	other	words,	the	law	was	too	important	a	tool	to	be	entrusted	to	politicians.39	
Both	the	law	and	legal	academia	were	put	to	the	service	of	the	Nazi	“machine.”
¶14	As	Führer,	Hitler	was	exalted	to	the	status	of	a	legal	concept.	In	1940,	J.	
Walter	Jones	(fellow	of	Queen’s	College,	Oxford)	described	the	Führer as	one	of	
two	principles	upon	which	the	Nazi	conception	of	law	was	based	(the	other	prin-
ciple	being	racial	homogeneity).40	Having	reviewed	Nazi	writings	on	the	subject,	
Jones	observed:
The	efficiency	of	all	political	and	legal	machinery	is	judged	by	the	smoothness	and	speed	
which	it	brings	to	the	functioning	of	the	Nation-State.	Action,	instant	and	overwhelming,	
must	be	the	primary	purpose	of	the	State.	.	.	.	Therefore,	State	action	is	dependent	on	the	
existence	of	a	Leader	(Führer)	and	on	unquestioning	faith	in	the	creed	of	leadership.41
This	nice	little	syllogism	justifies	totalitarian	rule	on	the	basis	of	expedient	state	
action.	
¶15	In	June	1934,	the	same	Dr.	Hans	Frank,	then	the	Bavarian	justice	minister	
as	well	as	director	of	 the	Academy	of	German	Justice,	phoned	Hitler	 to	 inquire	
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	 36.	 See, e.g., aKadeMie FüR deUtsChes ReCht, JahRbUCh 1936,	 at	 vi–vii,	 illus.	 ii	 (1936)	 (shows	Dr.	
Hans	Frank	 in	Nazi	 uniform	as	president	 of	Academie	 für	Deutsches	Recht);	 id.	 at	 144–45,	 illus.	
vi	 (shows	Dr.	Karl	Lasch,	director	of	 the	Academie,	 sporting	a	Nazi	 lapel	pin).	Note	 that	 in	1937	
Heidegger	declined	to	attend	with	the	German	delegation	a	Descartes	conference	in	France	intended	
as	a	forum	to	reconcile	Nazi	socialism	with	European	philosophy.	See saFRansKi, supra note	31,	at	
324–25.	Many	of	the	German	academia	wore	Nazi	uniforms.	Id.	at	325.
	 37.	 Throughout	 this	 article,	 I	 use	 “instrumental”	 in	 the	 same	 sense	 as	Heidegger	 uses	 “technical”	 or	
“calculative”	to	refer	the	reduction	of	law	and	legal	information	to	“resources”	to	be	ordered	to	some	
end.	See supra ¶¶	3–5.
	 38.	 Hans	Frank,	Vorwort,	in aKadeMie FüR deUtsChes ReCht, JahRbUCh 1933/34,	at	5–6	(1934)	(pas-
sage	translated	by	author).
	 39.	 See id.	at	5	(“Here,	in	the	past,	the	former	state’s	anonymous	playground	accounted	only	to	extracted	
economic	and	political	power	groups.”)	(passage	translated	by	author).
	 40.	 See J. walteR Jones, the nazi ConCeption oF law	4–5	(Oxford	Pamphlets	on	World	Affairs	No.	
21,	1939).
	 41.	 Id. at	5.
about	 the	“legal	grounds”	 to	carry	out	Hitler’s	order	 to	execute	nineteen	 leaders	
of	 the	Brownshirts	 (the	Röhm putsch),	 then	being	held	 in	Frank’s	 care.	Hitler’s	
response:	 “I’ll	 tell	you	 that	 the	 legal	grounds	 for	 everything	 that	happens	 is	 the	
very	 existence	 of	 the	 Reich!”42	 Being	 thoroughly	 converted	 to	 Hitler’s	 cause,	
Dr.	Frank	would	 later	declare,	 “[S]ince	 the	 foundation	of	 the	National	Socialist	
State	is	National	Socialist	law	and	order,	the	Supreme	Führer	is	by	definition	also	
our	supreme	judge	.	.	.	,	that	his	will	must	now	be	the	foundation	of	our	law	and	
order.”43	The	nightmare	of	the	world	as	gasoline	station	was	realized	into	the	rule	
of	a	single	will.	
¶16	Not	surprisingly,	Dr.	Frank	closed	his	telephone	conversation	with	Hitler	
by	committing	to	carry	out	the	executions;44	the	German	concept	of	order	(in	the	
sense	of	laying	the	foundation	of	the	Third	Reich)	demanded	it.	Later,	as	governor	
of	 occupied	 Poland,	 Dr.	 Frank	 would	 extend	 the	 reasoning	 justifying	 nineteen	
executions	 to	 seventeen	 thousand:	 “We	 must	 not	 be	 squeamish	 when	 we	 hear	
of	 seventeen	 thousand	 Poles	 executed.”45	Dr.	 Frank,	who	 began	 his	 career	 as	 a	
defense	attorney	and	then	became	a	legal	academic,	would	ultimately	be	convicted	
at	Nuremburg	and	hung	for	his	actions	as	governor	of	occupied	Poland.46
¶17	 The	 point	 of	 this	 painful	 odyssey	 through	 Nazi	 law	 is	 to	 illustrate	 the	
extremes	 to	which	 law	can	be	 reduced	 to	 serve	a	chosen	end	and	subjugated	 to	
a	single	will.	In	the	words	of	Dr.	Hans	Frank,	“the	Academy	for	German	Law	in	
almost	all	important	fields	of	law	has	supplied	an	abundance	of	valuable	sugges-
tions	and	contributions	for the realization of the National Socialist legal will.”47	It	
is	to	the	realization	of	will that	law	ultimately	succumbs	when	it	is	reduced	to	the	
status	of	a	technological	tool	by	calculative	thinking.
The Modern American Version—Law and the Billable Unit
¶18	In	contemporary	America,	the	technological	yoking	of	law	to	will—its	whole-
sale	conversion	to	“standing	reserve”—is	infinitely	 less	 inimical	and	perceptible	
than	in	Nazi	Germany,	but	the	danger	is	there,	nonetheless.	It	is	the	subtle	shift	in	
attitudes	accompanying	new	legal	technologies	to	which	law	librarians,	and	ulti-
mately	the	legal	profession,	must	direct	their	attention.
¶19	While	describing	an	experimental	system	that	seamlessly	combines	brief	
writing	 on	 the	word	 processor	with	 legal	 research—to	 facilitate	 a	 kind	 of	 self-
researching	brief—Dan	Dabney,	senior	director,	Thomson	Global	Services	GmbH,	
observed:	“[W]hat	is	happening	here,	at	least	potentially,	is	that	legal	research	has	
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	 42.	 niKlas FRanK,	in the shadow oF the ReiCh 85	(Arthur	S.	Wensinger	&	Carole	Clew-Hoey	trans.,	
Knopf	1991)	(1987)	(Hans	Frank’s	son	recounted	the	phone	conversation	in	an	impassioned	biogra-
phy	condemning	his	father’s	life	and	deeds	as	a	jurist	and	Nazi	officer.).
	 43.	 Id.	at	71	(parenthetical	comments	of	biographer	omitted)	(emphasis	added).
	 44.	 Id.	at	85.
	 45.	 Id.	at	128.
	 46.	 Id. at	356–71.
	 47.	 Frank,	supra	note	38,	at	6	(emphasis	added).
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ceased	to	be	a	particularly	separate	part	of	the	operation.	You	can	just	sit	down	and	
write	a	brief	and	the	authorities	you	need,	the	law	that	you	are	looking	for,	will	
find	you.”48	Dabney’s	education	as	an	information	scientist	is	apparent.	He	quite	
capably	connects	technological	developments	with	search	behavior.	
¶20	More	importantly,	Dabney	connects	legal	search	behaviors	with	underly-
ing	attitudes	about	 legal	arguments.	 In	 fact,	Dabney	 illustrates	 that	 the	behavior	
and	attitudes	 this	new	self-researching	brief	 facilitates	are	not	new.	He	quotes	a	
former	law	partner:	“You	know	when	I	write	a	brief,	I	do	the	legal	research	last.	I	
write	the	brief	and	when	I	see	something	that	probably	needs	authority	I	just	put	
in	 ‘(cite)’	and	go	on	and	write	something	else.	But	you	can	make	 the	argument	
because	you	know	what	the	arguments	are	going	to	be.”49	West’s	new	technology	
is	not	to	blame	for	this	attitude.	After	all,	the	technology	simply	facilitates	the	cal-
culative	thinking	and	culture	already	at	the	root	of	the	legal	profession.	West	and	
other	publishers	 simply	meet	 the	demand	 for	 information	services	and	products	
to	supply	authority	for	the	arguments	legal	practitioners	have	already	decided	to	
make.	
¶21	Dabney’s	most	 interesting	observation	explores	 the	philosophical	under-
pinnings	of	such	calculative	attitudes:
	 [T]he	reason	that	my	colleague	was	so	proud	of	this	is	that	it	reflected	his	rather	cynical	
attitude	about	the	law	itself.	There	is	no	sense	in	which	the	law	informs	you	at	all.	You	are	
creating	the	law	that	was	necessary	to	your	purposes	on	the	fly	and	you	were	never	going	to	
discover	that	law	wasn’t	the	way	you	wanted	it	to	be.	This	[is],	you	know,	the	legal realist	
mentality:	There	is	plenty	of	law	out	there	for	everyone.50
The	 information	 environment	 facilitates	 the	 triumph	 of	 legal	 realism.	 Indeed,	
Grant	C.	Gilmore	made	the	argument	back	in	1961	that	realism	is	a	reaction	of	the	
information	environment	to	the	presence	of	too	many	cases	in	the	system.51
¶22	Even	in	the	Anglo-American	tradition,	in	the	same	society	that	triumphed	
over	Nazism	and	Fascism,	the	prevailing	viewpoint	is	technological	and	calcula-
tive.	Heidegger’s	fears	aptly	criticized	American	capitalism	as	well	as	totalitarian	
ideologies:	 “‘Calculation’	 stands	 for	Americanism,	 ‘planning’	 for	 communism,	
and	‘cultivation’	for	National	Socialism.”52	The	labels	differ,	but	 the	methods	of	
Western	ideologies	all	share	calculative	thinking	at	their	core.	
¶23	Modern	thinking	about	law	is	also	calculative	in	nature.	The	principle	of	
flexible	stability,	that	the	“[l]aw	must	be	stable	and	yet	it	cannot	stand	still,”53	the	
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	 48.	 Dan	Dabney,	Envisioning	 the	 Future:	The	Publisher’s	 Perspective,	Remarks	 at	 the	 Future	 of	Law	
Libraries	 Symposium,	 Florida	 Coastal	 School	 of	 Law	 (Mar.	 10–11,	 2005),	 mms://broadcast.cali	
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	 50.	 Id.	(emphasis	added).
	 51.	 Grant	Gilmore,	Legal Realism: Its Cause and Cure,	70	yale l.J.	1037,	1041	(1961).
	 52.	 saFRansKi, supra note	31,	at	296.
	 53.	 poUnd,	supra	note	11,	at	1.
oft-recited	declaration	with	which	Roscoe	Pound	opens	 Interpretations of Legal 
History	and	which	is	engraved	above	the	moot	courtroom	at	Cornell	Law	School,	
facilitates	predictability,	economic	growth,	and	the	general	welfare.	While	Pound’s	
statement	has	been	elevated	to	the	status	of	a	legal	maxim,	its	underlying	rationale	
is	less	known.	“The	social	interest	in	general	security	has	led	men	to	seek	some	
fixed	bases	for	an	absolute	ordering	of	human	action	whereby	a	firm	and	stable	
social	order	might	be	assured.”54	Again,	 the	will	 to	order	drives	modern,	 instru-
mental	conceptions	of	law.	Law	is	simply	the	basis	for	“ordering	human	action,”	
although	as	Pound	argues,	the	resulting	construct	must	be	flexible	to	be	successful.	
Heidegger’s	description	of	technical	and	calculative	thinking,	based	upon	willing	
order,	corresponds	nicely	to	this	modern	conception	of	law.
¶24	The	conception	of	law	is	equally	calculative	and	instrumental	in	nature	in	
the	writings	of	other	modern	theorists.	Ronald	Dworkin’s	paradigm	of	law	as	the	
unending	chain	story	also	functions	to	maximize	the	values	of	stability	and	predict-
ability.55	H.L.A.	Hart,	another	luminary	of	jurisprudence,	stresses	law’s	“value	as	
an	instrument	for	the	realization	of	human	purposes.”56	Normative	theories	of	law	
and	economics	exult	in	the	efficient	administration	of	the	general	welfare.57	Noting	
law’s	instrumental	character,	Richard	Posner	comes	closest	to	identifying	the	tech-
nological	nature	of	law	(in	Heidegger’s	sense),	by	arguing:	“I	myself	do	not	think	
law	is	a	humanity.	It	is	a	technique	of	government.”58	Oliver	Wendell	Holmes,	Sr.,	
noted	poet	and	father	of	the	eminent	United	States	Supreme	Court	Justice,	also	saw	
law	in	a	technical	and	instrumental	context:	“Law	is	an	implement	of	society	which	
is	intended	for	every-day	work.”59	Holmes,	Jr.,	while	not	using	technical	language,	
commented	on	the	historical	origins	of	law	in	saying	that	“the	earliest	appearance	
of	 law	was	as	 a	 substitute	 for	 the	private	 feuds	between	 families	or	 clans.”60	 In	
sum,	the	modern,	instrumental	conception	of	law	is	clear.	Law	is	fundamentally	a	
resource	for	stability	in	an	unstable	world.	In	Heidegger’s	terms,	law	appears	as	
standing reserve—as	something	to	be	ordered,	with	the	rest	of	the	world	to	serve	
some	end.61	Small	wonder	that,	in	addition	to	Heidegger’s	philosophical	definition,	
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standing reserve	 is	used	as	an	accounting	concept	for	assessing	resources	in	the	
military	and	energy	industries.62
¶25	Reducing	 law	 to	 standing	 reserve	may	 seem	 unnecessarily	 perfunctory,	
especially	since	it	 is	hard	to	think	of	 it	 in	any	other	way.	Indeed,	 the	profession	
of	 law	 speaks	 of	 legal	 information,	 like	 other	 information,	 as	 a	 resource	 to	 be	
mined,	harvested,	ordered,	quantified	(in	billable	units),	packaged,	marketed,	and,	
ultimately,	consumed	to	some	calculated	end	or	purpose,	which	in	turn	will	serve	
some	other	overarching	end	or	purpose.	A	quick	survey	of	product	literature	rein-
forces	the	commoditization	of	legal	information	and	law:
	 l	 “Try	CQ	Legislative	 Impact	 and	you’ll	 see	 how	 this	 service	 can	 streamline	
your	work	by	pinpointing	 the	exact	places	where	pending	 legislation	would	
change	existing	laws.”63
	 l	 Advertisement	 with	 photo	 of	 attorney	 in	 front	 of	 circus	 booth	 labeled	
“Estrella’s	Prophecies.”	He	asks,	“How	will	my	judge	rule	on	this	issue?”	The	
subtitle	for	the	advertisement	reads,	“There’s	a	better	way	to	get	a	real	indica-
tion	of	how	your	judge	might	rule	on	a	specific	issue—strategic	court-records	
research	on	LexisNexis	Courtlink.”64
	 l	 “Draft	 high-quality,	 winning	 legal	 briefs,	motions	 and	 pleadings	 faster	 and	
more	accurately	with	Shepard’s	BriefCheck	for	the	Web.	.	.	.”65
	 l	 “When	you	need	an	answer	 to	 the	question,	 ‘Is	my	case	good	 law?’	 there’s	
no	question	which	 system	provides	a	more	comprehensive	or	more	 focused	
answer.”66
	 l	 “Westlaw	Litigator	can	help	you	in	every	aspect	of	your	case	and	at	every	stage	
of	the	process.	It	puts	all	your	key	litigation	resources	in	one	place	to	save	you	
time.”67
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	 62.	 See,	e.g., David	Newbery, Electricity Liberalization in Britain and the Evolution of Market Design,	in	
eleCtRiCity MaRKet ReFoRM: an inteRnational peRspeCtive	109,	120	(Fereidoon	Perry	Sioshansi	
&	Wolfgang	Pfaffenberger	eds.,	2006)	(illustrating	concept	of	energy	reserves);	M.	Rashidinejad,	Y.H.	
Song,	&	M.H.	 Javidi,	Ancillary Services (I): Pricing and Procurement of Reserves,	 in opeRation 
oF MaRKet-oRiented poweR systeMs 223	(Yong-Hua	Song	&	Xi-Fan	Wang	eds.,	2003)	(illustrat-
ing	 concept	 of	 energy	 reserves);	 Carlos	 Pascual,	 Office	 of	 the	 Coordinator	 for	 Reconstruction	&	
Stabilization,	U.S.	Dep’t	of	State,	Strengthening	U.S.	Reconstruction	and	Stabilization	Capabilities,	
Address	 Before	 Joint	 Event	 of	 the	 Center	 for	 Strategic	 and	 International	 Studies	 and	Woodrow	
Wilson	 International	 Center	 for	 Scholars	 (Oct.	 20,	 2004),	 available at http://www.state.gov/s/crs/
rls/rm/37430.htm	 (discussing	 role	 of	 foreign	 service	 supporting	military	 through	 rotating	 through	
“Standing	Reserve”).
	 63.	 Letter	from	Congressional	Quarterly,	Inc.	(undated	ca.	2006)	(copy	on	file	with	author).
	 64.	 LexisNexis	advertisement,	a.b.a. J.,	Feb.	2005,	at	7	(“Revealing	court-records	research	is	just	one	
way	LexisNexis	gives	litigators	a	strategic	advantage,	often	before	their	case	ever	gets	to	trial.”).
	 65.	 New Shepard’s BriefCheck for the Web:	 More Cite-Checking Accuracy Plus Web Flexibility,	 6	
lexisnexis inFo. pRoF. Update 93 (2006).
	 66.	 Lexis	Auto-Cite	advertisement,	a.b.a. J.,	August	1991,	at	45	 (“When	 it	comes	 to	building	strong	
cases,	there’s	strength	in	numbers	[of	precedent]”).
	 67.	 Westlaw	Litigator	advertisement,	a.b.a. J.,	Mar.	2004,	at	3.
	 l	 “Only	ALR	gives	you	the	assurance	you	haven’t	missed	any	case	law	on	your	
point.”68
	 l	 “In	addition	to	finding	the	primary	law,	you	can	check	your	firm’s	legal	argu-
ments	against	those	of	the	legal	profession’s	heavy	hitters.”69
	 l	 “Thanks	 to	 KeyCite	 and	 Table	 of	Authorities,	 you	 can	 relax	 knowing	 that	
nothing	affecting	the	precedential	value	of	a	cited	authority	will	escape	your	
notice.”70
The	 common	 theme	 from	 the	 vendor	 literature	 is	 simple:	 legal	 information	
resources	are	essential	tools	which	make	the	practice	of	law	more	efficient.	They	
proffer	 competitive	 advantage	 and	 a	 sense	 of	 security,	while	 putting	 the	 law	 at	
users’	 fingertips	 so	 that	 nothing	 is	missed.	 In	 Heidegger’s	 terms,	 the	 resources	
bring	 law	 into	 the	 order	 of	 standing	 reserve.	As	Dabney	 has	 pointed	 out,71	 law	
appears	to	have	the	same	characteristics	as	the	information	services	that	provide	
access	to	it	because	through	such	systems	the	law	always	stands	ready	to	supply	
argument	for	any	occasion	or	proposition.	The	question	is	how	to	think	otherwise.	
More	importantly,	has	Heidegger’s	nightmare	of	the	world	as	a	“gasoline	station”	
been	realized?
Daring to Think Otherwise—“In-formative” Reading
¶26	Dabney’s	use	of	inform	(as	in	“there	is	no	sense	in	which	the	law	informs	you”)	
is	both	interesting	and	entirely	consistent	with	his	behavioral	approach,	including	
conceptual	linkages	to	legal	realism.	Information	evolved	from	the	Latin	informare	
as	 in	“the	action	of	 forming	matter,	 such	as	 stone,	wood,	 leather,	 etc.,”	or,	with	
respect	 to	 informing	humans,	“the	action	of	 informing;	formation	or	molding	of	
the	mind	or	character,	training,	instruction,	teaching;	communication	of	instructive	
knowledge.”72	 To	 inform	 was	 transformative	 of	 character	 in	 respect	 to	material	
objects	or	the	human	mind	and	character.	Following	World	War	II,	however,	there	
was	 a	 shift	 to	 a	more	 technical	 or	 calculating	meaning	 of	 the	 term information	
(consistent	with	Heidegger’s	sense	of	the	term)	to	“define	anything	that	was	sent	
over	an	electric	or	mechanical	channel.”73	In	1949,	information	science	pioneers	
Claude	Shannon	and	Warren	Weaver	defined	information	as	“that	which	reduces	
uncertainty.”74	With	its	utility	established,	information	is	now	a	proper	“resource.”	
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	 68.	 Lawyers	Cooperative	Publishing	advertisement	 for	American Law Reports	 (ALR),	a.b.a. J.,	 July	
1991,	at	15.
	 69.	 Tim	Nixon,	How Online Briefs Save Time,	law. libRs. new MillenniUM, May–Jun.	2004,	at	7	(com-
menting	on	West’s	Online	Briefs).
	 70.	 Jay	Shuck,	WestCheck Meets the World Wide Web,	law. libRs. new MillenniUM, Mar.–Apr.	2004,	
at	5.
	 71.	 See supra note	50	and	accompanying	text.
	 72.	 RiChaRd saUl wURMan, inFoRMation anxiety 38 (1989).
	 73.	 Id.
	 74.	 Id.	at	39	(citing	ClaUde shannon & waRRen weaveR,	MatheMatiCal theoRy oF CoMMUniCation 
(1949)).
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Being	dedicated	to	“reducing	uncertainty,”	information bears	remarkable	relation-
ship	 to	order,	or	ordering,	and	fits	easily	with	Heidegger’s	concept	of	“standing	
reserve.”
¶27	The	same	 is	 true	of	 law.	As	discussed	earlier,	 legal	 information	 reduces	
uncertainty	by	providing	access	to	a	stable	system	of	rules	for	resolving	disputes	
in	a	predictable	way.75	In	short,	law	is	perhaps	the	principle	tool	for	ordering	our	
world.	 It	 is	no	 surprise	 that	 the	 law	 is	often	made	up	of	 “ord-inance”	 (deriving	
from	order).76	Indeed,	the	German	gesetz,	translated	as law,	also	means	“to	place”	
as	in	“to	set	down	order.”77	Returning	to	legal	information,	the	major	legal	pub-
lishers	facilitate	this	ordering	in	a	remarkable	way,	with	“Exhibit	A”	being	West’s	
Topic	and	Key	Number	system.	
¶28	The	 interpretation	of	 information	 as	 a	 tool	 for	 reducing	order,	however,	
contrasts	with	the	sense	that	Dabney	may	have	meant	for	the	term	 inform,	 in	its	
pre-war,	 non-technological	 sense,	 as	 information	 informing	 the	 reader.	 It	 is	 the	
individual	 user’s	 understanding	 and	 character	 that	 is	 formed,	molded,	 and	 edu-
cated.	It	is	in	this	sense	that	Isocrates	and	Plato	referred	to	law.	“Isocrates	claims	
that	proliferation	of	laws	and	the	search	for	akribeia	(precision)	[perhaps	another	
reference	to	order]	was	to	miss	the	real	function	of	law,	which	was	to	be	general	
and	morally	educative.”78	Plato	shared	a	similar	vision	with	respect	to	law	serv-
ing	 an	 instructional	 function	 and	 promoting	 social	 harmony.	 “Laws	 are	 partly	
framed	for	the	sake	of	good	men,	in	order	to	instruct	them	how	they	may	live	on	
friendly	terms	with	one	another,	and	partly	for	the	sake	of	those	who	refuse	to	be	
instructed,	whose	spirit	cannot	be	subdued,	or	softened,	or	hindered	from	plunging	
into	evil.”79	Plato’s	analogy	of	philosophy	curing	the	ills	of	 the	soul	as	a	doctor	
applies	medicine	to	a	sick	patient	is	particularly	apt	here.80	“[J]ustice	is	a	moral	
physician	and	cures	men	of	their	excesses	and	makes	them	better	people.”81	This	
is	the	original	sense	of	legal	information,	which	stresses	in-forming	or	educating	
and	molding	members	of	society.
¶29	While	browsing	a	well-known	rare	book	store	in	Salt	Lake	City,	I	happened	
upon	a	1633	third	edition	of	Lord	Edward	Coke’s	First Part of the Institutes of the 
Laws of England	 (otherwise	 known	 as	 the	Coke’s	Commentary on Littleton),82	
298 Law Library Journal [Vol.	99:2
	 75.	 See supra	notes	53–71	and	accompanying	text.
	 76.	 See oxFoRd english diCtionaRy online (Draft	 Revision	 Sept.	 2004),	 http://dictionary.oed.com	
(access	etymology	link	for	“ordinance,	n.”).
	 77.	 See id.	(2d	ed.	1989)	(access	etymology	link	for	“law,	n.”).
	 78.	 S.C.	Todd,	The Language of Law in Classical Athens,	 in	the MoRal woRld oF the law	 17,	27	
(Peter	Coss	ed.,	2000)	(citing	Isocrates	§§	7.33,	7.39-40).	See also	Paul	D.	Callister, Law’s Box: Law, 
Jurisprudence and the Information Ecosphere,	 74	UMKC l. Rev.	 263,	 277–78	 (pointing	 out	 the	
advantages	of	Stelae	as	a	medium	for	education	through	law).
	 79.	 5	plato,	dialogUes oF plato	 266	 (Benjamin	 Jowett	 trans.,	 3d	 ed.,	 rev.	 and	 corrected,	N.Y.	 and	
London,	MacMillan	&	Co.	1892).
	 80.	 plato, goRgias 69–71	(W.	Hamilton	trans.,	Penguin	Books	1960).
	 81.	 Id. at	70.
	 82.	 edwaRd CoKe, FiRst paRt oF the institUtes oF the laws oF england (3d	ed.	corrected,	London,	
M.F.I.H.	&	R.T.	assigns	of	I.	More,	esq.,	1633).
which	I	acquired	for	my	law	school.	The	volume	is	particularly	valuable	because	of	
the	marginalia,	evidence	of	provenance,	and	other	inscriptions,	including	one	from	
the	cover	sheet	bearing	a	quote	in	Latin	from	Quintilian	from	the	first	century	A.D.	
This	quotation	reveals	something	about	the	relationship	of	the	reader	to	the	text.	
“Those	who	strive	to	reach	the	heights	will	always	rise	higher	than	those	who,	giv-
ing	up	on	their	goals	because	of	despair,	immediately	halt	at	the	lowest	levels.”83	
It	is	not	a	testimonial	about	the	ease	and	usefulness	of	the	book,	or	its	utility	as	a	
resource;	rather,	it	emphasizes	the	journey,	which	the	reader	must	undertake,	and	
the	transformation	that	is	the	ultimate	reward	of	the	book.
¶30	 Frederick	 C.	 Hicks,	 whose	 legacy	 as	 a	 legal	 bibliographer	 and	 teacher	
is	 dear	 to	 the	 law	 library	 profession,	 recognized	 the	 difficulty	 readers	 had	with	
Coke’s	monumental	work,	writing	that	this	“‘painful	volume’	has	become	a	sym-
bol	for	all	books	which,	sparing	neither	author	nor	reader	in	going	to	the	bottom	
of	 things,	say	 the	 last	on	 the	subjects	of	which	 they	 treat.”84	Fundamentally,	 the	
prominent	legal	texts	in	earlier	times	bore	a	different	relationship	to	readers	and	
students	than	the	legal	information	resources	of	today.	Prior	texts	emphasized	in-
forming	the	student.	Modern	texts	are	more	easily	accessed,	perused,	and	searched	
in	both	print	and	digital	(including	convenient	“cut-and-paste”)	formats.
¶31	This	modern	change	 in	 the	 relationship	of	 readers	 to	 legal	 texts	 is	dem-
onstrated	 in	Otto	 Preminger’s	 film,	Anatomy of a Murder.85	 In	 the	 film,	which	
explores	the	insanity	defense,	or	“irresistible	impulse,”	the	lawyer	for	the	defense,	
Paul	Biegler,	played	by	Jimmy	Stewart,	does	something	incomprehensible	in	the	
modern	 practice	 of	 law.	Biegler	 and	 his	 alcoholic	 colleague,	 Parnell	McCarthy,	
played	 by	Arthur	O’Connell,	 actually	 choose	 to	 spend	 their	 leisure	 time	 drink-
ing	 bourbon	whiskey	 and	 reading	 case	 reporters—decisions	 by	 Justice	 Holmes	
no	less.86	For	a	practicing	lawyer	to	find	recreation	in	reading	case	reporters,	let	
alone	spend	significant	 time	 to	ponderously	read	cases	under	any	circumstances	
(while	tippling	with	a	colleague),	probably	strikes	most	present-day	attorneys	as	
anachronistic,	if	not	an	outright	Hollywood	fabrication.87
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	 83.	 Translation	of	handwritten	inscription	from	dedication	page	of	UMKC	law	library’s	copy	of	Coke’s	
Institutes.	See id. The	inscription	comes	from	Quintilian’s	Institutio Oratoria	and	reads:	“Altius	ibunt	
qui	 ad	 summa	nitentur	 quam	qui	 praesumpta	 desperatione	 qua	 velint	 evadendi	 protinus	 circa	 ima	
substiterint.”	E-mail	from	Holly	M.	Sypniewski,	Assistant	Professor,	Department	of	Classical	Studies,	
Millsaps	College,	 to	 Elisabeth	Bach-Van	Horn,	 Legal	Research	Assistant,	UMKC	School	 of	 Law	
(Aug.	16,	2006).	See 1	institUtio oRatoRia oF qUintilian	14–15	(bk.	I	preface,	l.	20)	(E.	Capps,	
T.E.	Page,	&	W.H.D.	Rouse	eds.,	H.E.	Butler	trans.,	London,	William	Heinemann	1920)	(n.d.).
	 84.	 FRedeRiCK C. hiCKs, Men and booKs FaMoUs in the law	97	(1921).
	 85.	 anatoMy oF a MURdeR	(Columbia	Pictures	1959).
	 86.	 Id.	 (McCarthy	 queries	Biegler:	 “Well,	what	 shall	we	 read	 this	 evening?	How	 about	 a	 little	Chief	
Justice	Holmes?”).
	 87.	 The	1959	movie	is	based	on	a	book	of	the	same	title	by	John	D.	Voelker	(writing	under	the	name	of	
Robert	Traver)	originally	published	in	1958,	when	Voelker	was	a	justice	of	the	Michigan	Supreme	
Court.	He	served	from	1957	to	1959,	when	he	retired	to	write	full	time	after	the	success	of	RobeRt 
tRaveR, anatoMy oF a MURdeR	(1958).	
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¶32	As	 unusual	 as	 the	 behavior	 of	 the	 fictional	 attorneys	 in	 Anatomy of a 
Murder	may	seem,	there	was	indeed	a	time	when	reading	(other	than	the	condensed	
and	heavily	edited	versions	presented	in	the	classroom)	was	dear	to	the	profession.	
Robert	C.	Berring	has	noted	that	“Daniel	Webster	probably	read	every	case	that	
was	published	by	every	American	appellate	court,	and	probably	read	English	cases	
as	well.”88	In	1769,	another	model	American,	John	Rutledge	wrote	a	telling	letter	
to	his	brother	Edward,	then	studying	law	in	England.	The	letter	advises:
[W]ith	regard	to	particular	law	books—Coke’s	Institutes	seem	to	be	almost	the	foundation	
of	our	 law.	These	you	must	read	over	and	over,	with	 the	greatest	attention,	and	not	quit	
him	till	you	understand	him	thoroughly,	and	have	made	your	own	everything	in	him,	which	
is	worth	 taking	out.	 .	 .	 .	 I	would	 read	 every	 case	 reported	 from	 that	 time	 [the	Glorious	
Revolution	of	1688]	 to	 the	present	 [1769].	 .	 .	 .	 I	would	have	you,	also,	 read	 the	Statute	
Laws	throughout	.	.	.	.	When	I	say	you	should	read	such	a	book,	I	do	not	mean	just	to	run	
cursorily	through	it,	as	you	would	a	newspaper	but	to	read	it	carefully	and	deliberately,	and	
transcribe	what	you	find	useful	in	it.89
Both	John	and	Edward	Rutledge	would	serve	as	delegates	to	the	General	Congress	
prior	to	the	American	Revolution	and	later	as	governors	of	South	Carolina.	Edward	
Rutledge	would	sign	the	Declaration	of	Independence,	and	John	would	serve	as	a	
Justice	on	the	United	States	Supreme	Court	and	chief	justice	of	the	South	Carolina	
Supreme	Court.90	Other	examples	of	equally	prodigious	readers	of	American	law	
are	easy	to	find.91
¶33	Reading	was	at	the	heart	of	an	English	and	early	American	legal	education,	
and	not	just	perusing,	but	a	painstaking,	purposefully	repetitive	and	comprehen-
sive	study	of	works	(as	of	1769,	eighty-one	years	of	cases),	 including	extensive	
personal	 annotation	 and	 transcribed	 notes.	 So	 voracious	was	 the	 reading	 of	 the	
nineteenth-	 and	 early-twentieth-century	 bar	 that	 courts	 justified	 selecting	 deci-
sions	for	publication	(rather	than	publishing	every	decision)	to	help	cut	down	the	
reading.	“The	leading	lawyers	in	every	State	are	expected	to	run	over,	if	they	do	
not	read,	every	case	in	every	new	volume	of	its	reports.	Every	case	dropped	[from	
publication]	lightens	the	task.”92	Indeed,	law	was	a	profession	of	readers.	But	why?	
Was	it	simply	a	matter	of	being	the	best	armed	for	court	or	was	something	deeper	
and	nobler	going	on?
¶34	The	 very	 essence	 of	 being	 a	 lawyer	was	 to	 be	 bookish.	 In	 a	 delightful	
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	 88.	 Robert	 C.	 Berring,	Collapse of the Structure of the Legal Research Universe: The Imperative of 
Digital Information,	69	wash. l. Rev.	9,	19	(1994).
	 89.	 John belton o’neall, 2 biogRaphiCal sKetChes oF the benCh and baR oF soUth CaRolina 
124–26	(Charleston,	S.G.	Courtenay	&	Co.	1859).
	 90.	 On	John	Rutledge,	see	1	id.	at	17–37;	on	Edward	Rutledge,	see	2	id.	at	115–29.
	 91.	 See, e.g., MooRField stoRey & edwaRd w. eMeRson, ebenezeR RoCKwood hoaR 30 (1911)	(Hoar	
served	as	a	supreme	court	justice	for	Massachusetts);	addRess oF hon. henRy w. blodgett Upon 
the eaRly baR oF ChiCago 7 (1896)	 (discussing	 reading	 habits	 of	 Illinois	 State	 Supreme	Court	
Justice	John	Dean	Canton).
	 92.	 siMeon e. baldwin, aMeRiCan JUdiCiaRy	274	(1905).
article	published	in	1937,	Max	Radin	explained	the	effect	on	modern	legal	schol-
arship	 of	 the	 seventeenth-century	work	 of	 Sir	 Edward	Coke	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 its	
grounding	 in	books.93	However,	 the	purpose	of	 such	 reading	 is	 best	 understood	
from	Lord	Coke	himself.	Coke’s	writings	go	beyond	“making	the	case”	to	include	
something	more	beneficial,	such	as	informing	the	reader	and	improving	individual	
self-governance	in	accordance	with	law.	Coke	quotes	Parliament	about	the	reason	
for	publishing	his	magnum opus,	the	Laws and Institutes,	in	English,	rather	than	
in	the	customary	legal	French:
That	the	Lawes	and	Customes	of	this	Realme	the	rather	should	be	reasonably	perceived	and	
knowne,	and	better	understood	by	the	tongue	used	in	this	Realme,	and	by	so	much	every	
man	might	the better governe himselfe without	offending	the	Law.	.	.	.	[G]ood	governance	
and	full	right	is	done	to	every	man,	because	that	the	Lawes	and	Customes	be	learned	and	
used	in	the	Tongue	of	the	Country:	as	more	at	large	by	the	said	Act.	.	.	.	No	man	ought	to	
be	wiser	than	the	Law.94
The	 highest	 purpose	 of	 publishing	 law	 is	 so	 that	 individuals	may	better	 govern	
themselves.	
¶35	The	moral	essence	and	transformative	character	of	law	books	are	evidenced	
in	 several	 ways.	 Early	 English	 judges	 and	 attorneys	 apparently	 elected	 to	 read	
Littleton’s	Tenures	 each	Christmas.95	Together	with	 the	Bible,	 such	books	came	
to	represent	individual	conscience.	In	1648,	during	the	Interregnum,	Judge	David	
Jenkins	was	accused	before	the	House	of	Commons	of	being	a	Royalist.	In	pros-
pect	of	hanging,	the	judge	found	strength	in	his	books:	“Multitudes,	no	doubt,	will	
come	to	see	the	old	Welsh	Judge	hanged.	I	shall	go	with	the	venerable	Bracton’s	
book	hung	on	my	left	shoulder,	and	the	Statutes	at	Large	on	my	right.	I	will	have	
the	Bible,	with	a	ribbon	put	round	my	neck,	hanging	on	my	breast.”96	The	symbolic	
moral	force	that	an	English	judge	placed	upon	the	Bible,	Bracton,	and	the	Statutes	
belies	a	reverence	to	legal	bibliography	alien	to	the	modern	practice	of	law.
¶36	The	law	itself	at	various	times	in	history	has	functioned	as	a	transformative	
agent,	not	simply	as	another	instrument	or	resource	for	ordering	the	world.	While	
this	 topic	 could	 be	 sufficiently	 addressed	 only	 in	 an	 article	 exclusively	 devoted	
to	 that	 purpose,	 a	 few	 examples	 are	 in	 order.	The	 thirteenth-century	Charter	 of	
Kurukan	Fuga	(forming	 the	Empire	of	Mali),	as	kept	by	oral	 tradition,	provides	
for	the	division	of	classes,	rules	for	collective	escheat,	transfer	of	property,	fixing	
dowry,	 and	 similar	matters,	 but	 also	 for	 positive	 relations	 among	 family	mem-
bers,	 avoidance	 of	 vanity,	 respect	 for	 seniority,	 tolerance	 for	 religious	 beliefs,	
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	 93.	 Max	Radin,	On Legal Scholarship,	46	yale l. J.	1124,	1127	(1937).
	 94.	 CoKe, supra	note	82, at	vi.
	 95.	 2	westMinsteR hall oR pRoFessional ReliCs and aneCdotes oF the baR, benCh, and woolsaCK 
8	(London,	John	Knight	&	Henry	Lacey	1825)	(describing	Roger	North	as	the	model	law	student);	see 
also	gilbeRt J. ClaRK, 2 liFe sKetChes oF eMinent lawyeRs: aMeRiCan, english, and Canadian 
101 (Kansas	City,	Lawyer’	International	Co.	1895);	hiCKs,	supra note	84,	at	95.
	 96.	 williaM Ralph doUthwaite, gRay’s inn: its histoRy & assoCiations	 213	 (London,	Reeves	&	
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protection	of	foreigners,	minimization	of	offenses	against	women,	joking	among	
classes,	and	description	of	 ideal	 leadership.97	 In	 the	charter,	 there	 is	 little	of	 the	
division	 between	 legal	 and	 normative	 standards	 that	modern	 legal	 practitioners	
and	theorists	would	recognize.	This	ancient	African	law	functioned	in	a	way	that	
transformed	 individuals	 by	 encouraging	 tolerance,	 respect,	 leadership,	 diversity,	
virtue,	and	even	humor.
¶37	Also	 drawing	 from	Africa,	 the	 Egyptian	 Demotic	 Code	 of	 Hermopolis	
West	(dating	from	about	730	to	15	B.C.	in	the	Twenty-Fourth	Dynasty)	is	in	the	
same	 tradition	as	both	Egyptian	wisdom	 literature	 and	 the	narrative	 classic,	 the	
“Tale	of	the	Eloquent	Peasant.”98	In	Europe,	the	ancient	Celts	lacked	a	clear	sepa-
ration	between	legal	maxim	and	aphorism	or	gnomic	literature,99	intimating	that	a	
common	tradition	functioned	both	to	resolve	disputes	and	to	instruct	character.	In	
classical	Greece,	Plato’s	Laws	suggest	that	“solemn	custom	often	prevails	over	that	
of	statute.”100	Indeed,	“custom	as	promulgated	orally	in	the	medium	of	Homer’s	
Iliad	 is	 an	 interweaving	 of	 both	 private	 and	 public	 codes	 of	 conduct.”101	Thus,	
Homer’s	classic	works	may	be	as	apt	a	source	for	law	as	any	statute,	and	probably	
much	more	transformative	in	effect.
¶38	A	quick	survey	of	ancient	Anglo-Saxon	legal	traditions	suggests	that	law	
functioned	merely	as	an	efficient	mechanism	for	administering	punishments	and	
avoiding	violence,102	much	as	Holmes,	Jr.	had	noted.103	However,	the	curious	title	
of	 the	 fourteenth-century	 code	 of	 customary	 law,	 known	 as	 the	 Sachsenspiegel	
(translated	“Saxon	Mirror”),	suggests	the	need	for	much	deeper	understanding.	
The	mirror	genre	examines	the	metaphysical	and	intellectual	dimensions	of	subjects	such	
as	virtue,	 law,	and	rulership.	Such	mirrors,	written	in	Latin,	 informed	and	instructed	the	
next	generation.	Eike’s	lawbook	[Der Sachsenspiegel]	fits	this	tradition,	but,	significantly,	it	
also	marks	the	first	such	instructional	prose	text	to	appear	in	the	vernacular.	Eike	borrowed	
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the	 concept	 from	 the	 well-known	 twelfth-century	 mirror,	 Honorius	 Augustodunensis’s	
Speculum ecclesiae,	in	which	the	Bride	of	Christ	looks	in	a	mirror	to	find	those	faults	in	
herself	that	might	be	objectionable	to	Christ.104
In	other	words,	the	Saxon	law,	despite	the	plethora	of	rules	and	penalties	permit-
ting	resolution	of	disputes	is	fundamentally	meant	as	text	for	the	populace,	in	the	
vernacular,	so	that	they	might	better	measure	themselves.	It	is	law	that	is	informa-
tive	in	nature.	
¶39	Thus,	it	is	possible	to	think	about	law	and	legal	information	as	something	
other	than	resources	for	efficient	exploitation.	Not	so	long	ago,	even	the	modern	
study	of	law	carried	transformative	impact.	Law	books	were	even	worthy	of	perusal	
during	one’s	 leisure	 time,	 to	be	 read	out	 loud	while	 sipping	drinks	with	 friends	
after	working	hours.	Legal	texts	were	the	kind	of	reading	one	recommended	to	a	
friend	or	a	close	sibling,	with	the	expectation	that	the	literary	adventure,	although	
difficult,	would	exalt	one’s	thinking	and	character.	Legal	education	was	a	lifelong	
quest—the	kind	of	journey	that	produced	giants	worthy	of	drafting	constitutions	
and	governing	nations.	It	is	indeed	possible	to	think	differently	about	law	and	legal	
institutions.
Prologue to Future Law Librarianship— 
Dealing with Obsolescence
¶40	As	the	opening	quotation	suggests,105	the	emergence	of	information	technolo-
gies	has	threatened	modern	librarianship	with	obsolescence,	or	at	least	the	percep-
tion	of	obsolescence.	Because	of	law’s	traditional	dependence	on	highly	structured	
repositories	of	legal	information,	the	threat	applies	as	well	to	law	and	legal	think-
ing.	Law	can	be	thought	of	as	a	resource	to	be	harnessed,	exploited,	and	ultimately	
rendered	 obsolete.	 “[N]ever	 send	 to	 know	 for	 whom	 the	 bell	 tolls,	 it	 tolls	 for	
thee.”106	The	fates	of	libraries	and	law	are	intertwined,	predicated	on	a	worldview	
that	reduces	their	status,	along	with	everything	else,	to	being	mere	resources,	suit-
able	for	exploitation.	This	outcome	is	not	foreordained,	however.	The	fundamental	
aim	of	every	law	library	ought	to	be	to	remind	its	patrons	and	constituents	to	dare	
to	think	otherwise—to	see	the	law	in	its	true,	transformative	essence.	If	law	librar-
ians	do	not	play	this	important	role,	the	battle	may	be	lost	entirely.
¶41	 In	 fall	 2004,	 I	 participated	 in	 the	 Salzburg	 Seminar,	 Libraries	 in	 the	
Twenty-First	Century.	A	product	of	the	conference	was	a	statement	titled	“Vision	
of	the	Communal	Role	of	Libraries.”	It	emphasizes	the	role	of	libraries	as	cultural	
institutions.	
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The	library	is	a	place	where	knowledge	and	information	freely	dwell	to	define,	empower,	
preserve,	challenge,	connect,	entertain,	and	transform	individuals,	cultures,	and	communi-
ties.	The	dwelling	place,	whether	physical	or	virtual,	is	the	product	of	collective	reflection,	
aspiration,	commitment,	expertise	and	organization.	It	is	both	a	byproduct	of	civil	commu-
nities	and	a	catalyst	for	cultural	progress,	inspiration,	expression	and	exchange.	Its	absence	
in	this	new	century	would	not	only	deprive	many	individuals	of	important	resources,	but	
also,	more	significantly,	such	loss	would	deny	humanity	an	essential	portion	of	its	shared	
identity	 and	 entitled	 liberties.	 The	 library	 can	 never	 be	 fully	 replaced	 by	 information	
technologies.	For	the	essence	of	its	communal	role	is	not	the	technological	mastery	over	
knowledge	and	information,	but	rather	the	provision	of	sanctuary	for	human	thought	and	
expression	in	any	medium.107
The	statement	is	intended	to	counter	perceptions	of	libraries	as	obsolete	resources	
and	emphasizes	the	role	of	libraries	as	cultural	 institutions.	Of	particular	impor-
tance	is	the	library’s	role	in	defining	and	enabling	communities	and	in	serving	as	a	
transformative	institution	and	sanctuary	for	human	thought	and	character.	Despite	
their	unique	features,	the	same	statement	applies	equally	well	to	law	libraries.
¶42	 In	 conclusion,	 let	me	 suggest	 that	 the	 legal	 academy	and	 librarians	 can	
think	about	law	libraries	in	ways	that	will	avoid	reducing	the	library	to	a	mere	set	
of	technologies	or	resources,	in	Heidegger’s	sense,	and	will	facilitate	recognition	
of	the	library’s	larger	role	as	a	cultural	and	transformative	institution:
¶43	Library as Portal to the World.	 Besides	 the	 pragmatic	 recognition	 that	
many	libraries	serve	more	virtual	visitors	than	physical	patrons,	the	library	must	
serve	as	a	window	to	a	wider	world,	allowing	patrons	access	to	unfamiliar	places	
and	ideas.
¶44	Library as Social Knowledge Network.	An	organization’s	principle	value	
is	not	its	physical	assets,	but	what	the	organization	“knows”—including	both	the	
information	 it	 accesses	 and	 stores	 and	 the	 collective	 knowledge,	 wisdom,	 and	
social	 relationships	 of	 the	 organization’s	members	 (in	 this	 case	 the	 knowledge,	
skill,	and	relationships	of	the	librarians).
¶45	Library as Transforming User Behavior and Character.	The	transforma-
tive	impact	of	a	library	on	its	users	and	constituents	is	a	prime	justification	for	its	
continued	existence.	Not	only	should	 improving	 research	skills	and	 information	
literacy	drive	much	of	a	library’s	effort,	but	it	must	also	emphasize	its	impact	on	
the	overall	character	and	education	of	its	users.	Consequently,	it	will	never	do	for	
law	libraries	simply	to	“train”	students	in	legal	research	skills.108
¶46	 Library as Transformative and Communal Place.	As	 addressed	 in	 the	
Salzburg	 statement,	 the	 law	 library	 provides	 sanctuary	 for	 human	 thought	 and	
expression	and	serves	an	important	role	in	defining	the	respective	cultures	of	the	
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law	schools	and	 legal	profession.	 It	 is	a	 temple	 to	which	patrons	may	withdraw	
from	 the	world,	 if	 only	 for	 a	 brief	moment,	 to	 reorient	 their	moral	 compasses,	
reflect	 on	 their	 ideals,	 remember	who	 they	 are,	 and	 discover	 the	 entirely	 unex-
pected	(including	the	intellectual	and	moral	fiber	at	the	heart	of	the	profession).
¶47	 In	 closing,	 remember	 the	 noble	 character	 of	 libraries	 and	 the	 transfor-
mative	 power	 of	 law.	 These	 twin,	 glorious	 institutions	 represent	 far	 more	 than	
resources	for	human	consumption,	subjugation,	and	exploitation.	It	is	not	simply	
the	futures	of	libraries	and	legal	professions	that	are	at	stake,	but	the	underpinnings	
of	civilization	and	the	continuing	tenure	of	the	rule	of	law.
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